Hindsight is 20/20

Today's post comes from the memoirs of Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, "Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative." Should have gone to the...left?

"It seems remarkable that the assumption of Col. Long (of Lee's staff) so easily passed unchallenged that Confederate guns in open and inferior positions could "suppress" Federal artillery fortified upon commanding ridges...Comparatively the weakest portion of their line was Cemetary Hill, and the point of greatest interest in connection with this battle is the story of our entire failure to recognize this fact...There was but one single advantage conferred by our exterior lines, and but one, in exchange for many disadvantages. They gave us opportunity to select positions for our guns which could enfilade the opposing lines of the enemy...What has been called the the shank of the Federal fish-hook, was subject to enfilade fire from the town and its suburbs. There were and are others still easily recognizable on the ground. The salient angle is acute and weak...

From nowhere else was there so short and unobstructed an approach to the Federal line, and one so free from flank fire...Within the edge of the town between these two positions was abundant opportunity to accumulate troops and establish guns at close ranges.

As long as Gettysburg stands and the contour of the hills remains unchanged, students of the battlefield must decide that Lee's most promising attack from first to last was upon Cemetary Hill, by concentrated artillery fire from the north and assaults from the nearest sheltered ground between the west and northeast."

This is one of the first discussions of an attack on the left on the third day that I have seen or heard, and this from one of the most talented artillery officers of both armies, trained especially to have an eye for good ground. It's also interesting from the fact that Longstreet is the only one who gets credit/blame for a dissenting view of the plan for Pickett's Charge, but it seems as though the man in charge of the critical bombardment, and untimately the decision to begin the attack, also had a notion of imminent failure. I highly recommend this book, as it is one of the few which is not afraid to point out the mistakes and failures of ANV high command.

But then again, hindsight is 20/20...